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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT RELIES ON CASE LAW WHICH 
REQUIRE A LITIGANT TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONTENTIONS. THOSE CASES DO NOT SAY A 
LITIGANT MUST ATTACH SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS TO THE ARGUMENTS THEY 
SUPPORT. THE DEFENDANT PRESENTS NO 
AUTHORITY REQUIRING THAT SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTS BE ATTACHED TO PAPERS FILED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Throughout its Appellee's Brief, Defendant Wal-Mart relies on authorities which 
require a litigant to support his contentions as holding that a litigant must attach copies 
of deposition pages on which he relies to the subject legal memorandum. Defendant 
repeatedly fails to recognize the distinction between the two concepts. None of the 
authorities on which Defendant relies require copies of the deposition pages on which 
Plaintiff relied in her trial court memoranda to be attached to that document. 
In fact, in none of those cases is the issue of attaching supporting authorities to 
memoranda even discussed. The cases relied upon by the Defendant merely hold that 
a litigant is required to support his factual allegations. For example, Defendant relies 
on Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). When the plaintiff in 
that case, Thayne, was faced with a motion for summary judgment he filed a 
memorandum in opposition which "simply reiterated the general allegations of his 
unverified complaint." Id. at 123. The court noted that Thayne "did not file any 
affidavits or other evidence in support of his complaint, nor did he attempt to present 
any other evidence." Id. at 124 (emphasis added).The court held that Thayne could not 
rest on his unverified complaint in the face of a properly supported motion for summary 
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judgment. It held that "Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting some 
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material fact." Id. at 125. 
There is absolutely no discussion in Thayne of whether the supporting documents which 
Thayne should have filed should have been attached to his memorandum. The court 
granted summary judgment because there were no supporting documents, not because 
Thayne had referred to supporting documents without attaching copies of them. 
Defendant also relies on Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), as did the trial judge. The portion of the opinion in 
Franklin Financial which the trial judge quoted in his Memorandum Decision states that 
,f[w]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails 
to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials" the court may conclude 
there are no genuine issues of fact unless the moving party's supporting evidence 
discloses such an issue. Id. at 1044. That statement fits the facts of Franklin 
Financial: The party opposing the motion for summary judgment did not file any 
opposing affidavits or a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. See id. However, those facts are simply not present in this case. The 
Plaintiff here filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (See R. at 0113-0104.) Furthermore, each factual statement in the 
memorandum was followed by a specific reference to the deposition in which the 
asserted fact appeared. ' (See R. at 0112-0109.) Each of those references included the 
page of the deposition on which the asserted fact appeared. (See R. at 0112-0109.) 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In short, the cases on which Defendant relies are valid authority for the 
proposition that a party must support his factual contentions. However, there is simply 
nothing in either Franklin Financial or Thayne which even considers the issue raised 
by this case, namely whether copies of deposition pages to which a litigant refers in a 
memorandum for the trial court must be attached to the memorandum. 
Plaintiff does not contest the proposition for which Defendant argues, namely that 
a litigant must support her allegations. Indeed, Plaintiff agrees with the Defendant on 
this point. The difference between the parties here is that Plaintiff contends, and asks 
this court to recognize, that the necessary support may be provided by references rather 
than by attaching copies of deposition pages. Plaintiff strenuously contends, as is 
detailed in her Appellant's Brief and, thus, is not repeated here, that there is no Utah 
authority requiring a litigant to attach copies of deposition pages to a trial memorandum. 
Plaintiff further asks this court to recognize that none of Defendant's authorities actually 
discuss this issue, much less hold that she was required to attach the deposition pages 
to her trial memorandum when she included detailed, accurate references to the 
appropriate deposition pages in the memorandum. 
II. THE DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES SEVERAL 
ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AND 
THE NATURE OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROCEEDING. 
A. The Plaintiff Does Not Claim That The Defendant 
Attached ,fAH Of The Portions Of Blain's And 
Freeman's Deposition Transcripts That Support Blain's 
Misidentification Argument.11 
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Defendant states, at page 19 of its Appellee's Brief, that 
Contrary to Blain's representations, Wal-Mart did not attach all of 
the portions of Blain's and Freeman's deposition transcripts that support 
Blain's misidentification argument. 
The reason for Wal-Mart's failure to refer to any page of the Appellant's Brief on 
which this alleged representation is made is obvious: Plaintiff makes no such 
representation. Plaintiff states, at page 23 of her Appellant's Brief, that 
Assuming arguendo that copies of deposition pages cited in a 
litigant's memorandum to the court should be attached to that document, 
the court nevertheless erred in granting summary judgment. The evidence 
which was before the court establishes that a material question of fact as 
to the Defendant's negligence was raised by the evidence contained in the 
deposition pages on which the Defendant relied. 
In addition, on page 25 of her Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff states that 
The trial judge appears to have ignored the fact that many of the 
pages relied upon by the Plaintiff in her opposing Memorandum were also 
cited by the Defendant in its Memoranda. Thus, the court had copies of 
the pertinent deposition pages. The Plaintiff strenuously contends that the 
facts contained in the deposition pages attached to the Defendant's Trial 
Memoranda, and the inferences fairly drawn from those facts, raise a 
material question of fact regarding the Defendant's negligence. 
As these two excerpts from the Appellant's Brief make clear, Plaintiff does not in any 
way contend that Defendant attached "all of the portions of Blain's and Freeman's 
deposition transcripts that support Blain's misidentification argument." Appellee's Brief 
at 19. Plaintiffs contention is that the pages which were attached to the Defendant's 
memorandum support a finding that a material question of fact was present.l 
Plaintiff, of course, also contends that a great deal of additional support is present 
on the pages of the depositions which were not given to the court with the Defendant's 
trial memoranda but to which the Plaintiff referred in her trial memorandum. 
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B. The Defendant's Argument Assumes That The Testimony 
Of Melia Freeman Is Accurate And That It Would Be 
Credited By A Jury. Defendant Fails To Recognize That 
The Credibility Of Freeman, Like That Of Any Witness, 
Must Be Determined By The Trier Of Fact, And That By 
Asking The Trial Court And This Court To Accept 
Freeman's Testimony Defendant Is Asking The Courts 
To Make Factual Determinations Which Must Be Left To 
The Jury, 
Throughout its Appellee's Brief, Wal-Mart relies on the testimony of Melia 
Freeman as establishing the facts of this case. (See Appellee's Brief at 22 et seq.) For 
example, Defendant states, at pages 22-23 of the Appellee's Brief, that 
[t]he clear and substantiated evidence in the record shows that (a) Troy 
Guevara discovered Ms. Blain after she fell, (b) that a female employee 
from the fabrics department arrived at the scene after Plaintiffs fall and 
told Guevara that she had cleaned up the spill and that the spill started 
back in fabrics, (c) that Melia Freeman was that employee, (d) that when 
Ms. Freeman arrived at the scene, no one, including Blain, was lying on 
the floor, and (e) when Freeman left the scene, the spill had been 
completely cleaned up. 
It is certainly true that there is evidence in the record supporting the five contentions 
made by the Defendant. The fact that there is such evidence, however, is practically 
irrelevant to the current proceedings. Defendant moved for summary judgment. On 
such a motion, the court must consider the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any doubts or uncertainties in favor of 
that party. Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); English 
v. Kienke, 11A P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), affd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant's entire argument, both in the trial court and on appeal, assumes that 
Freeman's testimony is accurate and would be accepted by a jury. There is simply no 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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basis for such an assumption. As Plaintiff discussed in her Appellant's Brief, 
Freeman's deposition testimony provides ample evidence (in the deposition pages 
attached by the Defendant to its trial memoranda) to raise serious questions regarding 
Freeman's credibility. (See Appellant's Brief at 31-32.) Furthermore, Freeman had 
been an employee of the Defendant and was involved in the incident. She has an 
obvious bias toward her former employer and wanted Wal-Mart to believe that she 
performed her job adequately. Those incentives, as well as the substance of Freeman's 
testimony, clearly indicate that a question of Freeman's credibility was raised and, thus, 
that her testimony should not be considered authoritative. Instead, consistent with the 
well-established standard for evaluation of summary judgment motions, Freeman's 
testimony must be considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Considered 
in that light, and speaking bluntly, Freeman's testimony must be considered to at least 
be biased or a complete fabrication. If a jury chose to disbelieve part or all of 
Freeman's testimony, the Defendant's factual assertions are completely unfounded. In 
short, a jury's evaluation of Freeman's credibility is important to this case.2 By 
2Defendant contends that Freeman's credibility should not be considered because 
the matter was not raised below. (See Appellee's Brief at 26.) Defendant cites two 
cases which state the general rule that issues raised at trial cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal. The issues to which the courts in those cases were referring 
involved substantive theories on which a litigant relied to obtain relief; none involved 
the credibility of a key witness. Plaintiff contends that the credibility of a key witness 
is always before the court. See Susan S. v. Israels, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 1997) 
and Sansevere v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 581 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 1992). See 
also Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1, and Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 
949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997). Furthermore, the trial judge here made an implicit 
determination regarding Freeman's credibility when he entered summary judgment 
based on her testimony. In such a situation, there is simply no reasonable basis for the 
Defendant's contention that Freeman's credibility was not an issue before the trial court. 
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accepting the Defendant's arguments based on that testimony, the trial court implicitly 
made an inappropriate determination of credibility rather than leaving that issue to be 
determined by a jury. Such a determination was improper. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The Defendant attempts to distract this court from the point of Plaintiffs 
argument regarding Freeman's credibility. Defendant states, at page 25 of its 
Appellee's Brief, that Plaintiff argues in her Appellant's Brief that 
a jury could infer that Freeman avoided aspects of her job, such as looking 
for safety hazards, because she admitted to sometimes removing her 
smock to avoid interacting with customers. Id. at 31-32. This argument 
is an unreasonable and unfounded stretch of the evidence. Furthermore, 
Blain takes the testimony out of context. A review of the transcript shows 
that Freeman testified she sometimes takes off her smock so that she can 
quickly and efficiently, without customer distraction, clean the floor in the 
event of a spill. Deposition of Melia Freeman at 60; R. 118. This 
testimony is supportive of Wal-Mart's position, and it in no way advances 
Blain's case.. 
Careful consideration of this portion of Defendant's argument reveals that it 
misrepresents Plaintiffs argument and ignores the fact that this case involves a 
summary judgment motion. 
As an initial matter, Defendant completely ignores the fact that the argument 
contained on pages 31 and 32 of Plaintiffs Appellant's Brief is contained in a 
paragraph which begins M[t]he jury's evaluation of Freeman's credibility is critical to 
this case." Plaintiff relies on Freeman's testimony regarding her removal of her smock 
to illustrate that Freeman's own testimony contains statements which render her 
credibility suspect. . Stated briefly, Plaintiff contends that a jury could very reasonably 
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doubt the credibility of a retail employee who admits in a deposition that she removes 
her uniform in order to avoid helping customers. 
Two other troublesome matters are also raised by Defendant's attempt to dismiss 
Plaintiffs comments regarding Freeman's testimony that she sometimes removed her 
smock in order to avoid customers. First, Defendant mischaracterizes Freeman's 
testimony. Freeman stated: 
I may have even taken my smock off to clean it up so that nobody even 
knew I was a employee to stop me. 
Q. Is that something you would do now and then to avoid that 
problem? 
A. * Sometimes, yeah, like if you had to get to do something. But 
I usually kept it in my back pocket. I never hid it. It was always there, 
and the employees knew who I was so—[.] 
(R. at 0118.) It is clear that Freeman testified that she would remove her smock when 
there was 'fsomething,, she needed to do. Defendant states, however, that "Freeman 
testified that she sometimes takes off her smock so that she can quickly and efficiently, 
without customer distraction, clean the floor in the event of a spill." (See Appellee's 
Brief at 25.) A comparison of Freeman's actual testimony with Defendant's description 
of it shows an obvious discrepancy: Freeman stated that she would remove her smock 
if "she had to get to do something" but Defendant restates this testimony by saying 
Freeman testified that she would remove her smock to clean up a spill. Certainly one 
inference which can be drawn from Freeman's testimony is that she would remove her 
smock to clean spills, but that is obviously not the only reasonable inference which can 
be drawn from the testimony. Another equally reasonable inference is that Freeman 
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would remove her smock whenever, in her own opinion, there was something she 
needed to do. The plain language of her testimony in no way restricts the times at 
which she would remove her smock to circumstances involving removing safety 
hazards. 
More importantly, Defendant's argument on this point once again ignores the fact 
that this case was decided on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, any inference to 
be drawn from Freeman's testimony must be drawn in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, not the light most favorable to Defendant. Although a jury might accept the 
inference for which Defendant argues, that inference cannot be considered in the 
procedural posture created by the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Canfield 
v. Albertsons, Inc.; English v. Kienke. 
C. The Defendant Repeatedly Discusses The Point At Which 
It Had Actual Notice Of The Dangerous Condition 
Which Caused Plaintiffs Injury, But Ignores The 
Controlling Legal issue, Which Is The Time At Which 
The Defendant Should Have Had Knowledge Of The 
Condition. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff "seems to ignore the governing legal standards 
that are required to be met by an injured party to make out a prima facie case of 
negligence against a defendant store owner." (Appellee's Brief at 27.) Plaintiff 
contends that it is the Defendant, not Plaintiff, who is ignoring the controlling legal 
standards applicable to this case. The Defendant states that Blain must establish that 
it had notice of the spill in order to recover. It then ignores the evidence on which 
Blain relies to make the required showing. Wal-Mart dismisses Plaintiffs arguments 
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on this point as "nothing more than bare allegations unsupported by facts in the record." 
(Appellee's Brief at 31.) 
The evidence supporting Plaintiffs contention that Defendant had ample time to 
discover and locate the spill before Plaintiff fell on it is detailed in Plaintiffs 
Appellant's Brief and will not be repeated at length here. Briefly summarized, however, 
the evidence (contained in the deposition pages which Defendant attached to its trial 
memoranda) shows that the Plaintiff fell in the front part of Defendant's store. Freeman 
had cleaned the spill starting at the back of the store and working her way to the front 
of the store. Freeman testified that it took her several minutes to clean the entire spill 
after she discovered it. Defendant's store manager, Troy Guevara, testified that Wal-
Mart employees should have passed over the area in which the spill was located about 
every five minutes. Thus, the spill should have been discovered within five minutes by 
Wal-Mart employees who routinely passed over the area. Nonetheless, Freeman is 
apparently the only Wal-Mart employee who noticed the spill or took any actions 
toward cleaning it up. 
Plaintiff recognizes that her case, at this point, is based in part on circumstantial 
evidence and on inferences. It is clear, however, that jury verdicts may be based on 
such evidence. See John Q. Hammonds, Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1998); 
Lohse v. Faultner, 860 P.2d 1306 (Ariz. 1992). Plaintiff asks this court to recognize 
that her evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor and thus that the 
trial judge erred in granting summary judgment. 
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III. THE DEFENDANT ADOPTS THE CASE OF BLOIS V. 
FRIDAY, 612 F.2D 938 (5TH CIR. 1980), AND 
ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THAT CASE ON ITS 
FACTS, BUT IGNORES THE HOLDING OF THE 
CASE WHICH ESTABLISHES THE STANDARD FOR 
GRANTING RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT SUCH AS 
THE ONE ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish the case of Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th 
Cir. 1980), on which Plaintiff relied for the standard controlling decisions under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(b), from this case on the facts. Although Plaintiff discussed the facts of 
Blois in order to make the court's statement of its holding intelligible, Plaintiff did not 
in any way contend that Blois and this case were factually similar. The holding in Blois 
was not restricted to cases involving similar facts. Instead, the court there held that a 
plaintiffs motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from summary judgment should 
be granted where there is no proof that the judgment resulted from serious misconduct 
and where there would be no prejudice to the opposing party from granting the relief. 
As Plaintiff discussed at length in her Appellant's Brief, the trial court may have 
entered summary judgment in this case because plaintiff did not attach copies of 
deposition pages to her memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The absence of the copies resulted from counsel's reading of the controlling 
authority, which Plaintiff stills contends is correct, but which is clearly at the very least 
reasonable. There is simply no basis for a holding that acting in accordance with the 
plain language of controlling legal authority is "serious misconduct" sufficient to 
deprive a litigant of her cause of action. 
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In response to Plaintiffs argument that her motion for relief from judgment 
should have been granted, Defendant states that 
Blain further claims that the court committed error by raising the. question 
of attachment sua sponte. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 14 and 35-36. 
Contrary to Blain5s assertion that the court voluntarily raised the issue, 
Wal-Mart, in its Reply Memorandum to Blain's Memorandum Opposing 
Summary Judgment, specifically called the court's attention to the fact that 
Blain predicated her misidentification argument "wholly on speculation'1 
and failed to offer "specific facts". Defendant Wal Mart Stores' 
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-14; R. 154-155. 
(Appellant's Brief at 34-35.) This statement requires comment for two reasons. First, 
statements to the court below that Plaintiffs argument was based on speculation and not 
specific facts did not in any way complain of the absence of copies of the deposition 
pages on which Plaintiff relied. Read in context, they merely refer to Defendant's 
contentions that Plaintiff had not raised a material question of fact. 
Secondly, Plaintiff does not claim that it was error for the trial court to raise the 
matter sua sponte. Plaintiff discussed the fact that the court, not the Defendant, raised 
the issue of the lack of attached copies as part of its discussion showing that there was 
no prejudice from the lack of the copies. Plaintiffs argument was, and remains, simple. 
Defendant did not complain of the lack of the copies. Thus, there can be no finding, 
as is required under the standard announced in Blois, that the opposing litigant would 
have been prejudiced by granting a relief from the summary judgment. Plaintiff did not, 
and does not, contend that it was error for the trial court to raise the issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff/Appellant Dee Blain requests that 
this court REVERSE the summary judgment entered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. Steven/Sullivan; esquire 
Robert J. ^oBiyjSc Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-8915 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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